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In recent years, violence, caused by turf wars between drug cartels and the 
government's offensive launch against them, became distressingly familiar 
in Mexico. Government officials claimed that drug-related violence was 
mostly concentrated in the northern border and Pacific regions, including 
the states of Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Michaocan, 
and Sinaloa} Although violence was traditionally contained within cartels 
and the security forces, recent trends indicate that conflict is now spreading 
to the population at large. Available statistics on the escalation of violence 
vary from source to source. Yet Mexico's official figures, last revealed in 
January 2012, estimated that close to forty-seven thousand people have 
died since President Felipe Calderon took office in 2006.2 Mexico's fear of 
drug-trafficking violence was justifiable; powerful drug cartels engaged in 
turf wars, arms trafficking, kidnapping, and executions. 
To deal with this security challenge, the Mexican government relied 
increasingly on military and conventional security strategies. Indeed, mili-
tarization became the preferred means to deter and to dissuade organized 
crime. Thousands of soldiers were incorporated into the federal police 
force, and President Calderon deployed more than forty thousand troops 
across the country to fight drug cartels. 1 In fourteen of thirty-two federal 
states, a member of the armed forces ran the agency responsible for public 
security, while an active-duty military officer served as head of the local 
police in six states.4 
The use of military means to deal with public security and law enforce-
ment is certainly not new, but the rise of violence and the increased role of 
the armed forces in policing have raised concerns about the impact of mili-
tarization and securitization. Two questions drive this study: What factors 
contributed to the move toward militarization in Mexico, and what were 
the effects of such a strategy? 
Concerning the first question, I argue that the militarization of Mexican 
politics was not merely a reflection of an issue (drug trafficking) being a 
security threat but the result of political choice. That is, the government's 
military strategy stemmed directly from international and domestic pres-
sures. On the one hand, U.S. military aid and Colombia's military approach 
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to drug trafficking influenced and shaped Mexican strategy preferences. On 
the other hand, civil society shared a portion of the blame for tacitly sup-
porting such policies while failing to make the government accountable 
for its actions. This is where Joel Migdal's concept of "the state in society" 
becomes relevant for this study. In looking at state-society relations, Migdal 
deals with the issue of how societies in weak states tolerate, facilitate, and 
permit the state to develop capacities.s In Mexico's case, the state increased 
its coercive force to deal with organized crime, but it did so at the expense 
of the society it claimed to protect. 
I argue that militarization increased human-rights abuses committed 
by troops, eroded civilian oversight, and undermined coordination efforts 
between security agencies. Hence, in relationship to the second question, 
I claim that militarization generated an insecurity dilemma-that is, "an 
internal predicament in which individuals and groups acting against per-
ceived threats to assure their own security or securities consequently create 
an environment of increased threat and reduced security for most, if not all, 
others within the borders of the state."6 Ironically, in the case of Mexico, 
the insecurity dilemma was not restrained to its domestic entourage, in 
which society was eventually left with an increased sense of insecurity, but 
went beyond its borders, affecting Mexico's regional community. 
To develop my argument, this study is divided into two sections. The 
first section discusses the sources of militarization in Mexico's strategy 
by focusing on the international and social demand for military action. 
The second section analyzes the unintended consequences of such actions, 
including repressive policing, negative effects on accountability and human 
rights, and spillover effects in the Central American region. 
The Move toward Militarization 
To analyze Mexico's security dilemma, we must first identify the sources 
of militarization. Although the literature contains many meanings of the 
concept of "militarization," I define the term as a process "of adoption and 
use of military models, methods, concepts, doctrines, procedures, and per-
sonnel in police activities, thus giving a military character to public safety 
(and public space) questions."7 Militarization is not restricted to policing 
and may include judiciary matters, natural-disaster rescue missions, and 
public-health issues. To some extent, militarization is part of a broader 
political process. Once a decision has been made about the transformation 
of an issue into a security matter, politicians can then decide to use military 
means to tackle security concerns. In fact, militarization has become the 
norm in most, although not all, developing states. Substantial descriptive 
work has empirically demonstrated that states with very scarce resources 
have a tendency to spend significant amounts of money on defense and 
military policy to deal with public-security challenges.H 
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Mexico has not been an exception. As described in the introduction, 
militarization was the preferred means to deter and to dissuade organized 
crime, especially during the Calderon administration (2006-2012). The 
key military actors in this case were two autonomous ministries: the army 
(the air force is subsumed within the army's structure), also known as the 
Ministry of Defense, or Sedena; and the navy, also known as Marina. The 
army was the president's preferred law-enforcement agency to counter nar-
cotics and crime, which reinforced its role as guarantor of internal security 
and order. Because it was the larger service, it received the bulk of the 
financial resources and the media's attention. Its budget increased at higher 
rates than the navy's. For instance, in 2000, at the beginning of the Fox 
administration, Sedena was allocated $20.4 billion pesos as part of its bud-
get. By the end of his administration, the amount increased to $26 billion 
pesos, a 27 percent increase (compared to the 15 percent increase the navy 
received during the same period of time). In 2007, President Calderon's 
inaugural year, Sedena's budget jumped to more than $36 billion pesos (a 
23 percent increase from the previous year), while the navy's budget was 
maintained at roughly the same budgetary level ($10 billion pesos in 2007 
versus $9.1 billion pesos in 2006).9 Similarly, in the Calderon administra-
tion, the navy assumed a much more active role in the government's fight 
against cartels. Specifically, the Marines were deployed to such states as 
Veracruz and Tamaulipas to capture and to disrupt the Zetas, considered 
the most extreme, violent drug cartel, established by former army comman-
dos, and the Golfo Cartel. lIl 
Certainly, Mexico had used military forces to eradicate drug planta-
tions and cartels for decades. 11 However, the visibility of the armed forces 
in law-enforcement operations was different and substantially increased 
after President Calderon took office. In the past, the Mexican government 
had stayed away from the conventional national-security rhetoric and had 
focused its concerns on the so-called structural roots of drug trafficking, 
such as demand, economics, and social issues. In recent years, however, 
Mexican officials explicitly embraced a national-security approach to drugs, 
claiming that cartels amassed a large number of capabilities and posed a 
serious security threat to the state, which, in turn, justified the use of armed 
forces. As Alejandro Poirc~, then federal security spokesman, revealed dur-
ing a press conference, cartels and their turf wars have been responsible for 
30,913 execution-style killings, 3,153 deaths in shootouts between gangs, 
and 546 deaths involving attacks on authorities. 12 
Hence, the most widely held view in Mexico is that the Calderon admin-
istration had no alternative but to rely on the armed forces to tackle the 
security crisis. This implies that decisions were based on the lesser-evil 
principle, which maintains that politicians were confronted with few viable 
civilian solutions and thus tempted by military options. Indeed, law-en-
forcement institutions in Mexico had suffered from institutional corrup-
tion, lack of accountability, and trust deficits. On the one hand, national, 
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regional, and local police forces did not have the investigative capabilities, 
intelligence, or resources to cope with the challenges posed by organized 
crime. On the other hand, civil society had been traditionally skeptical 
toward law-enforcement agencies, as a culture of mistrust prevailed in the 
relationship between police authorities and citizens in general (more on 
citizens' perceptions below).13 
The institutional fragility of Mexico's public-security forces thus pro-
vided incentives to militarized strategies and policies. However, police cor-
ruption and lack of trust were not the only motivating factors. According 
to Stephen Randall and Juliana Ramirez, "All nations, whether Canada 
and other North American countries or the countries of the Caribbean and 
Latin America, face challenges in developing a culture of trust between 
police institutions and the nation's citizens."14 As I argue in the follow-
ing sections, the impulse toward militarization was also reinforced by two 
dynamics: international socialization and societal demands for militariza-
tion. Both of these dynamics, in conjunction with law-enforcement fragil-
ity, foreclosed certain options and reinforced others, ultimately leading to 
undesired outcomes. 
International Incentives for Securitization and Militarization 
The move toward militarization in Mexico cannot be understood without 
examining the influence exercised by the U.S. In fact, the U.S. government 
has traditionally seen the challenge of drug trafficking through a national-
security lens, and its policies have shaped preferences across the region. 
Militarization can be traced back to the Nixon administration, when the 
term "war on drugs" was first coined during the Cold War era. This implied 
that fighting organized crime could be treated like conventional warfare 
and drug leaders regarded as enemies. Their ability to inflict social dam-
age could thus be negated (deterred) and weakened (dissuaded) via military 
force. During the Reagan administration, the "war on drugs" took on a 
different dimension, as legislation and executive measures were approved to 
encourage Latin American military intervention in the fight against drugs. 
As Adam Isacson argues, through such measures as the 1989 Andean 
Initiative, U.S. government officials provided strong economic incentives to 
involve the armed forces in antinarcotic campaigns: "With U.S. training, 
equipment, and diplomatic backing, Latin American militaries on counter-
drug missions began to mount roadblocks, perform internal surveillance 
(including wiretaps), execute searches and seizures, force down suspicious 
aircraft, eradicate corps, patrol rivers, and, in some cases, arrest and inter-
rogate civilians."15 U.S. antidrug programs focused their energies on four 
policies: military economic aid, arms transfers, training and professional-
izing armed forces, and using private military companies.16 These programs 
effectively militarized drug-trafficking policies, therefore providing the ini-
tial impetus to use military means to solve narco-trafficking concerns. 
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No other U.S. initiative has had so much influence on Mexico's strate-
gies toward drug trafficking as Plan Colombia. The plan was originally 
engineered as a six-year package by President Andres Pastrana to help 
Colombia eliminate drug trafficking and to promote peace after decades 
of civil war. Yet U.S. objectives placed a premium on military strategies to 
combat cartels and encouraged crop substitution to decrease drug supply. 
The tragic events of 9111 provided an additional impetus to accelerate mili-
tarization, as a new terror/drug nexus was identified. Plan Colombia was 
thus transformed from a strategy to bring down drug supplies and prices to 
a tool to fight insurgency and domestic insecurity.17 
With U.S. military assistance, the Colombian armed forces were able 
to strike a number of military victories against the FARC (Fuerzas Arma-
das Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish or the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia), all while pulverizing (but not eliminating) some of 
the most active cartels, which, in turn, had a close relationship with many 
of the guerrillas. The military decreased the insurgents' and cartels' capa-
bilities to engage in kidnapping, extortion, and illegal roadblocks, leading 
to the pacification of Cali and MedellIn. Nevertheless, Plan Colombia 
had no effect on the price, purity, and availability of cocaine and heroin 
in the U.S.IH 
Not surprisingly, in the Colombian example, the Mexican government 
found a source of inspiration for its own security strategy. In fact, President 
Calderon visited Colombia more than any other Latin American country 
during his first three years in office (three official visits between 2006 and 
2009).19 Like their counterparts in Colombia, Mexican officials would want 
to pacify northern and Pacific cities most affected by cartel violence. 
Indeed, Mexico's national-security policy was strikingly similar to the 
one designed for the Andes by the U.S. It too involved the deployment of 
a large number of security forces-including army and Marine troops as 
well as military police-to clear cities by hunting members of violent gangs 
and drug traffickers. This was then followed by months of heavy patrols in 
which several state agencies moved in to provide basic services. Ideally, the 
strategy should have worked to allow for the withdrawal of security forces, 
leaving behind functioning civilian forces and peaceful neighborhoods. In 
practice, however, the strategy led to an almost permanent presence of mili-
tary troopS.21l 
Like its counterpart strategy in Colombia, Mexico's policy toward drug 
cartels partially relied on U.S. military assistance. The so-called Merida 
Initiative (MI) channeled additional U.S. resources-US$1.2 billion for a 
three-year period between 2007 and 201021_to assist Mexican authorities, 
including military aid to purchase technology and equipment to improve its 
fight against drug cartels. During its first year of operation, MI benefitted 
mostly, although not exclusively, the army, because it included scanners, 
telecommunications systems, helicopters, and transport aircraft used by 
the forces on landY Furthermore, U.S. military training programs were 
Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications 47 
also extended to Mexico to help professionalize military and police troops, 
leading to joint exercises and sharing of intelligence information. 23 
For instance, in December 2009, the New York Times revealed that the 
U.S. embassy initially told the Mexican Army where a major cartel leader 
was hiding out, but the military failed to respond. The embassy then told 
the navy, which proceeded to deploy an elite American-trained unit into 
the action, eventually killing the leader after he refused to surrender.24 This 
led to the infamous confidential cable incident, in which then-U.S. Ambas-
sador Carlos Pascual praised the country's military-led drug strategy but 
noted interagency rivalries and called the Mexican Army "risk averse."25 
The confidential cables revealed the extent to which U.S. influence shaped 
operations and even tactics in Mexico, even as strong service rivalries per-
sisted between the forces themselves. 
Finally, in February 2011, the New York Times once again revealed that 
the U.S. Department of Defense had authorized the use of unarmed drones 
over Mexican skies to collect information to turn over to Mexican authori-
ties. A high-altitude drone is believed to have helped Mexican law-enforce-
ment agencies find the suspected killers of a U.S. Immigration and Customs 
agent, murdered in Ciudad Juarez. 26 
Consequently, militarization is not merely a reflection of drug traffick-
ing's becoming a serious security threat. In fact, the Mexican strategy was 
fed by regional dynamics, including international pressure from the U.S. 
and emulation from Colombia. On the one hand, U.S. policies provided 
economic and political incentives that favored national-security strategies 
and doctrines. On the other hand, the experience of neighboring states, 
such as Colombia, provided the "know-how" for applying the military 
framework in the fight against drug cartels. 
Social Demand for Militarization 
It would, of course, be naive to believe that international dynamics were 
solely responsible for Mexico's securitized and militarized strategy. The con-
ventional wisdom that developing states are dependent on structural con-
ditions (such as international powers or powerful elites) does not apply to 
Mexico. Migdal has pointed out a tendency to "too facilely assume that 
those at the pinnacle of politics can effectively repress or transform the rest 
of society."27 Following Migdal's insights, the coeditors of this volume argue 
in their introduction that elites may control state institutions and attempt 
to shape society, but they are equally constrained and redirected by societal 
factors. Indeed, the Mexican government has not been a passive agent of 
international demands and pressure; society has facilitated militarization. 
For decades, the most concerning issue for Mexicans was unemployment; 
this was a logical outcome after the country experienced multiple economic 
crises triggered by inflation, debt, and financial collapse. Nevertheless, as 
the economic setting in Mexico stabilized, Mexican citizens became much 
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more concerned for their own security. Recent survey polls conducted by 
one of Mexico City's leading public research institutes showed that Mexi-
cans feel threatened by drug trafficking and organized crime, global warm-
ing, AIDS, food shortages, and the global economic crisis, in that order. By 
contrast, concern about international terrorism and tougher U.S. immigra-
tion policies decreased from 70 percent and 63 percent respectively in 2004 
to 66 percent and 51 percent in 2008. 2X 
In spite of, or perhaps because of, the fear of organized crime, Mexicans 
overwhelmingly supported the increased role of the military in law-enforce-
ment activities. In a 2007 survey conducted by the newspaper Milenio, more 
than 80 percent of those surveyed believed the armed forces should be used 
for public security, while less than 9 percent was against such measures. 29 
More recent polls, conducted between March and April 2011 by the Pew 
Research Center's Global Attitude Project, found that an overwhelming 
majority of Mexicans (83 percent) still favored the use of the military to 
fight cartels. At the same time, 74 percent supported U.S. military training 
for Mexican troops, and 64 percent welcomed U.S. assistance programs for 
the Mexican police and armed forces. (See chart below for reference.) 
Therefore, society in general accepted and tolerated the use of mili-
tary means to deal with public-security issues. It has at least legitimized 
Table 3.1 Support for Using Mexican Army to Fight Drug Cartels 
2009 2012 2011 
Using Mexican army to fight cartels 
Support 83 80 83 
Oppose 12 17 14 
DOl/'t kl/ow 5 3 3 
U.S. help in training Mexican military 
Support 78 78 74 
Oppose 17 19 26 
DOl/'t kl/ow 5 3 1 
Provide money to Mexican police/military 
Support Support 63 57 64 
Oppose 28 37 33 
DOl/'t kl/ow 8 6 3 
Deploy U.S. troops to Mexico 
Support 30 26 38 
Oppose 59 67 57 
DOl/'t kl/ow 11 7 4 
SOl/ree: Pew Research Institute 2011 
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militarization, if not explicitly demanded it. Yet, as argued in the following 
paragraphs, such overwhelming support had unintended consequences. 
The Unintended and Spillover Effects of Militarization 
The side effects of militarization were multiple and unanticipated. As Rob-
ert Jervis has informed us, domestic- and foreign-policy actions have conse-
quences, even though the effects are not always seen in the areas anticipated 
by policy makers.30 In the past five years, militarization yielded four sub-
optimal and unintended consequences, including a toughened approach 
toward crime-mano dura-increased human-rights abuses, erosion of 
civilian oversight, and spillover effects into Central America. 
The Mano Dura Approach, Agency 
Competition, and Military Erosion 
The use of armed forces for law-enforcement activity has had a direct 
impact on police and justice reform in Mexico. 11 Public officials often justi-
fied the presence of troops in such cities as Ciudad Juarez as a provisional 
device until enough federal and local police forces were trained and select-
ed. 12 However, five years into this strategy, the number of military-police 
operations has all but decreased. Deploying troops was a highly visible 
action that required little or no coordination with multiple actors, such as 
states, local authorities, agencies, and courts. This was a top-to-bottom 
approach to decision making, relying essentially on presidential powers. 
The strategy did not have to succeed to yield political outcomes; it only had 
to be visible enough for society to notice and to perceive an increased pres-
ence of the state. As argued in the introduction of this chapter, militariza-
tion was a politicized response to organized crime. What were the effects 
of such policy? 
First, militarization contributed to the emergence of the so-called mano 
dura, or iron-fist approach toward policing in Mexico. According to Mark 
Ungar, "Mano dura is a toughened version of 'zero tolerance,' a policy based 
on 'broken windows' theory, which argues that petty crimes, intimidation, 
and physical deterioration are the real causes of crime because they scare 
off law-abiding citizens and allow delinquency to take the root in an area." 
33 In consolidated democracies, such an approach can be implemented only 
with proper police training, oversight mechanisms, and coordination with 
social services. But in "Latin America, zero tolerance is applied without 
such support or outside controls, so that the mano dura is often just a con-
tinuation of predemocratic practices and a justification for the dividing line 
drawn by many officials between 'public order,' associated with a strong 
state, and 'human rights,' associated with delinquency."34 
Indeed, the mana dura approach applied in Mexico was based on 
the principle that a forceful response against crime would deter future 
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criminal behavior. The goal was no longer to contain and to control but 
to dissuade or to eliminate criminal acts by imposing harsh and forceful 
penalties on those who commit minor or major offenses. The strategy also 
relied heavily on enforcement, including raids, operatives to hunt crimi-
nals, and intrusive street patrolling. To some extent, mano dura tactics 
endorsed the potent virtues of the proverbial military iron-fist or strong-
deterrent approach. The strategy was indeed based on military deterrence, 
in which the underlying message was: "Do not show up, because if I see 
you, I can catch and kill you." 
The use of military forces in public-security functions was thus an attempt 
by the Mexican state to deter criminals through a more forceful presence. 
Policing practices followed suit, as law-enforcement agencies increasingly 
adopted and emulated military iron-fist norms and standards. Repressive 
policing was in fact inducted and indoctrinated by military agents. The mil-
itary trained newly recruited federal police forces, and police agencies were 
structured following the armed forces' image. For example, the structure 
of the federal police (FP), created in 1998 by the merger of several agen-
cies, resembled the army's internal structure. According to Marcos Pablo 
Moloeznik, this was particularly true for the FP general staff, which had a 
resemblance to the military's chief of staff. As the author argues, "Militari-
zation is also visible in the composition of the Coordinacion General de las 
Fuerzas Federales de Apoyo-Federal Support Forces Office-one of the 
central administrative units of the organization. Concretely, and because of 
an agreement between the Ministry of Defense and the Interior Ministry 
in 2000, 4,899 soldiers from the Third Brigade of the military police were 
sent to the Federal Support Forces."3s Moreover, active members of the 
armed forces ran many state agencies responsible for public security. 
Besides the mano dura approach, militarization had perverse effects on 
interagency cooperation efforts. The diplomatic cable incident described 
above revealed that the so-called war on drugs ignited service rivalries 
between the navy and the army. However, competition was not restricted 
to the military branches; it also included rivalries between the armed forces 
and local police units. Quite often, military operations engaged in fighting 
against local police forces that were convoluted with the cartels themselves. 
For instance, in the state of Nuevo Leon, the army arrested and disarmed 
more than 250 police agents in one single campaign conducted in September 
2011. ~6 Surely, institutional corruption has been a serious challenge for law-
enforcement efficiency, but military operations fostered mistrust between 
forces and did little to increase transparency or jointness. Militarization 
duplicated security functions and agencies, increased costs, and created seri-
ous coordination problems for civilian agencies and military establishments. 
Finally, the use of military strategies in public-security issues also weak-
ened the military as an institution. On the one hand, anti narcotic cam-
paigns and law-enforcement operations exposed the armed forces to the 
same dangers of institutional corruption that have so far tainted police 
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forces. For instance, a report submitted by the Chamber of Deputies in 
2008 estimated that in an eight-year period, close to 150,000 soldiers had 
deserted the armed forces (the army has a force of 183,700 men), many 
of whom eventually joined drug cartels, such as the ZetasY On the other 
hand, such operations undermined military professionalism and encour-
aged national-security doctrines. For almost seventy years, civilian control 
over the armed forces in Mexico was established through the profession-
alization of the officer corps, which effectively neutralized the military as 
a political factor and subordinated it to the political imperatives of the 
dominant party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI).3H Hence, 
Mexico evaded the dangers of military dictatorship and national-security 
doctrines that dominated the rest of Latin America. Nevertheless, the cur-
rent strategy placed the armed forces in the front and center of political 
order and put an emphasis on the internal uses of force, which effectively 
resembled national-security doctrines. For scholars of military affairs, such 
as Alfred Stepan, this approach not only affects training, professionalism, 
and combat readiness for conventional warfare but also politicizes soldiers 
as they become increasingly concerned about internal warfare, placing a 
premium on political stabilityY Under this context, the Calderon strategy 
blurred the distinction between police and military forces. 
Civilian Oversight and Human-rights Abuses 
Politicians and legislators increased the military's role in public security but 
did not take any significant steps toward increasing military accountability 
and oversight. Congress authorized defense budgets and promotions without 
properly reviewing or discussing these issues.4o Lawmakers did not seem to 
know how to legislate on military affairs, especially because the armed forces 
were placed in the front and center of Calderon's security strategy. This effec-
tively translated into attention deficits-that is, a widespread disinterest in 
defense policy and a general lack of concern for the "development of plans 
and processes designed to provide for the oversight, organization, training 
and deployment, and funding of the armed forces."41 
In particular, congressional committees showed no interest in investigat-
ing the increasing number of human-rights abuses committed by the mili-
tary. Antidrug campaigns required raids and troop patrols with armored 
personnel carriers in highly urban settings. This included not only ground 
troops but also air support in which helicopters were used to shoot at tar-
gets. Because cartel leaders mingled with local residents, however, distin-
guishing between criminals and bystanders was simply impossible. Hence, 
soldiers often shot at people indiscriminately, leading to collateral dam-
age. Furthermore, troops were then delegated with multiple law-enforce-
ment functions, from arrests and traffic tickets to investigating domestic 
disputes, arresting drunks, and running prisons and police academies.42 
In the absence of oversight, accountability, and training mechanisms, the 
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potential for military abuses was never properly minimized. Indeed, allega-
tions against the military for human-rights abuses reached alarming lev-
els under the Calderon administration. According to the National Human 
Rights Commission, the number of allegations of serious abuses committed 
by troops increased from 182 complaints in 2006 to a cumulative total of 
more than 4,800 in 2011. These included warrantless arrests and deten-
tions, unintended civilian casualties, and deliberate extrajudicial killings.43 
The position held by most legislators was that the military could be 
trusted to judge its own when abuses occurred. Most of these arguments 
were based on a narrow interpretation of the military's code of justice and 
constitution, which allowed for military jurisdiction for crimes and faults 
against military discipline. Hence, civilian authorities routinely accepted 
the military's jurisdiction in cases involving human-rights abuses.44 Mili-
tary tribunals, however, failed as a self-monitoring mechanism, because 
none of the cases analyzed by military investigations led to the criminal 
conviction of a single soldier. Amnesty International described military tri-
als as lacking basic safeguards to ensure independence and impartiality.4\ 
The issue eventually reached international dimensions in 2009, when the 
Inter-American Human Rights Court ruled that Mexico's military could 
not handle cases of abuse against civilians. This binding decision was one 
of four since 2009 where an international body ruled that Mexico had to 
modify the military's code of justice to make it compatible with interna-
tional standards.46 Mexican human-rights organizations then turned to the 
International Criminal Court and requested that it investigate President 
Calderon, accusing him of allowing soldiers to kill, torture, and kidnap 
civiliansY Strictly speaking, this decision could be treated as a fire alarm 
that, under normal conditions, should have triggered civilian intervention 
in defense policy. Yet politicians failed to take corrective measures. 
In response to international pressure, President Calderon proposed to trans-
fer a limited jurisdiction to civilian courts to deal with certain abuse cases 
involving troops but leave serious crimes aside, such as extrajudicial killings. 
However, most nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and human-rights 
activists felt that such measures fell short of what was required by the inter-
national community.4K Congress, on the other hand, failed to bring a legisla-
tive initiative to the floor, so neither the Lower House nor the Senate never 
debated the issue. The absence of congressional action motivated a judicial 
decision by the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice in July 2011, which finally 
ruled that civilian judges might prosecute members of the military who com-
mit human-rights violations. The court did not automatically remove all such 
cases from military tribunals, but rather made a recommendation that may 
require further congressional approval. 
Ironically, the most recent effort to bring accountability and reform 
came from judges and not from legislators. This might increase the chances 
of bringing justice to victims of abuse, but it raises other questions. From 
a justice perspective, civilian courts can be equally ineffective in punishing 
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impunity precisely because of their lack of expertise in military affairs. As 
David Shirk argues, "Mexico's civilian courts have proved woefully ineffec-
tive .... [Ilf military human rights violators find the same degree of impu-
nity we see for other criminal actors, then their victims will have little justice 
and this decision will have little real meaning." 4~ From a defense-policy 
perspective, this case sheds light on the intrinsic problems of involving the 
armed forces in mano dura policing activities without proper mechanisms 
of transparency and accountability. 
Certainly, these rulings were contested and opposed, as military leaders 
declared that they could not operate without some legal protection from pros-
ecution. Several lawmakers, from the left and the right, seemed to agree and 
supported them by failing to legislate.50 Civilian politicians thus grappled 
with how, or even whether, to police the military. In the long run, politicians 
ceded authority to the military, allowing it a degree of institutional autonomy 
that has actually undermined civilian control at a time when Mexico is also 
democratizing. The end result is not only more drug violence but also less 
transparency and, in fact, more violations against the citizens the Mexican 
state aims to protect (creating an insecurity dilemma). Ultimately, militariza-
tion has triggered and instigated more violence and insecurity. 
Spillover Effects 
So far, this chapter has focused on the unintended consequences of milita-
rization in the domestic level. It has argued that Mexico's official security 
strategy not only was inefficient but also triggered more violence, weakened 
state institutions, and undermined public security. An insecurity dilemma 
was generated-that is, an attempt by the state to increase its domestic 
security yielded more insecurity over the long run. The term "insecurity 
dilemma," first developed by Brian L. Job, was intended to describe the 
internal security paradox and challenge faced by most developing nations. 
It stressed the national or regime level, in opposition to the international 
level or image, which, although anarchical, had more stability and certainty 
than many developing states. As Job has argued, the insecurity dilemma 
does not make the state more vulnerable to external threats, because "the 
norms and responses of the contemporary international community protect 
states from such threats and results, despite their lack of capacity and fail-
ure to achieve any national consensus."51 
Nonetheless, the insecurity dilemma in Mexico is no longer constrained 
to the domestic arena. In fact, its collateral effects are now being exported 
elsewhere. Just as U.S. policies and Colombian strategies in the early 1990s 
shaped Mexican strategies, militarization in Mexico is now affecting the 
Central American region. This is another indicator that drug trafficking 
and the conventional strategies to tackle it are truly global. 
Indeed, according to The Economist, which dedicated a special issue 
to analyze the effects of organized crime in the region in 2011, "Central 
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America forms a bridge between Colombia, the world's biggest cocaine pro-
ducer, and Mexico, which is the staging post for the world's biggest market 
for drugs-U.S. As pressure has mounted on the mobs, first in Colombia and 
now in Mexico, Central America has attracted more traffic. Ten years ago it 
had fewer cocaine seizures than either Mexico or the Caribbean; by 2008 it 
accounted for three times more than both combined. Over the same period 
the murder rate rose across the region, doubling in some countries."'l 
Ironically, the push toward militarization is forcing powerful Mexican 
cartels, such as the Zetas and Golfo, to move some of their operations into 
smaller, nearby countries, such as Guatemala, Honduras, and EI Salvador. 
This is having unintended and tragic consequences. In some of these coun-
tries, the murder rate has spiked to almost three times that of Mexico (for-
ty-six homicides per hundred thousand people in Guatemala.)11 In other 
words, the strategy implemented in Mexico is having a spillover effect in 
the region. 
Surprisingly, in spite of or because of Mexico's security failure, some 
Central American states have emulated Mexican militarized strategies. For 
instance, in January 2012, Otto Perez Molina, a former army general, was 
inaugurated as president of Guatemala. He was the first military official to 
lead the country since its return to democracy in 1986. Upon taking office, 
Perez requested an overturning of a long-standing ban on Washington's mili-
tary aid to Guatemala. Like President Calderon in Mexico, Perez ran on a 
mano dura campaign that promised to crack down on organized crime. He 
too has requested more U.S. military assistance to fight Mexican cartels. \4 
Given the evident institutional weaknesses within these states (from 
local police to courts), it is not surprising that some of these Central Ameri-
can countries, such as El Salvador and Guatemala, have been emulat-
ing the Mexican path by militarizing their own security strategies. The 
unintended consequences, however, can be much more devastating here, 
precisely because these states share legacies of civil war, human-rights vio-
lations, and military abuse. For these cases, the fear is not just an insecurity 
dilemma but also the virtual collapse of the state. 
The international community is certainly not attenuating these perverse 
effects . So far, North America (U.S., Mexico, and to some extent Can-
ada) has provided the usual prescription: limited aid (mostly coming from 
MI), intelligence information, and more military and police training. IS Yet 
Canada and the United States are not completely immune to the collat-
eral effects of militarization. It is worth remembering that violence and 
civil war in Central America triggered a massive wave of immigration into 
North America in the early 1980s. The current failure to contain violence 
caused by cartels and the repressive measures undertaken by many Central 
American states and Mexico could potentially trigger a similar outcome-
increased flows of immigration. Furthermore, the tactics used to decapitate 
drug-cartel leaders in Mexico are unlikely to change or to modify addiction 
or consumption patterns in the Western Hemisphere. Militarization and 
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intensified law enforcement may disrupt established drug routes and lead 
to an increase in arrests and drug seizures. But, as Michael Kenney argues, 
these measures are ephemeral, as the illicit drug trade quickly readapts 
and moves its transportation routes and distribution networks closer to 
where the consumers are located (North America and Europe). Ironically, 
increased militarization has forced smugglers to develop complex criminal 
international networks that reach the U.S., Canada, and even Europe.56 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments developed in this chapter deal with the origins of militariza-
tion in Mexico and its side effects. I have argued that Mexico is not alien to 
international influences. The drive toward militarization has been shaped 
in part by external dynamics, including security polices in the U.S. and 
Colombia. Securitization is, in fact, reinforced by geography and proxim-
ity. As Barry Buzan and Ole Waever argue, "Simple physical adjacency 
tends to generate more security interaction among neighbors than among 
states located in different areas. The impact of geographical proximity on 
security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, 
societal, and environmental sectors."S7 
Similarly, I have argued that the move toward militarization has been 
facilitated by domestic trends. In the Mexican case, society has enabled 
the state to hold a virtual monopoly over the security apparatus and has 
granted a tacit approval to use military means to deal with public-security 
challenges. Ironically, the move toward militarization has increased the 
role of the Mexican state. Civil society has indeed facilitated and permit-
ted the state to develop coercive capabilities. Increased public resources 
(money, equipment, technology, and personnel) have been invested and 
mobilized to improve public security. But, as Migdal reminds us, "One 
must be extremely cautious before equating a growing state apparatus and 
ability to get rid of a strongman with state predominance."58 In the Mexi-
can context, increased state capabilities have not translated into increased 
state control over organized crime. 
The immediate risk is not just that the military evolves its own political 
thinking, disconnected from the society that it serves, but also that it may 
come to exercise an unjustified use of force, leading to an internal paradox of 
increased violence and insecurity. Efforts by civil society and politicians alike 
to seek closer vigilance over the armed forces and to demand greater account-
ability in handling public security have, thus far, been insufficient. In this 
context, militarization has actually worsened and deteriorated public security, 
undermining the ability of the state to deliver a basic public good: safety. 
Indeed, the side effects of these processes have been devastating. Security 
institutions have been undermined and weakened and civilian oversight 
eroded, while crime rates increase or, when they appear to decrease, they 
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cannot remove the generalized sense of insecurity. The result is, in effect, 
an emerging insecurity dilemma. This is a security paradox, compounded 
by the internationalization of the "war-on-drugs" strategy that now affects 
the Central American region. 
Given this bleak diagnosis, what can be done? For good lessons learned, 
the North American region should perhaps look at Costa Rica and Nicara-
gua instead of Mexico. These Central American states have lower murder 
rates than any of their neighbors and have opted for preventive, communi-
ty-based policing, all while avoiding the temptation of militarization and 
repressive policing. Likewise, the report by the UN Global Commission on 
Drug Policy recently declared the war on drugs a failure and advocated to 
replace the criminalization of drug consumption with the offer of health and 
treatment services to those who need them. This new approach shifts the 
emphasis of drug consumption from criminalization and militarization to 
health care and addiction treatment. Although these alternative approaches 
do not eliminate trafficking and organized crime per se, they could yield 
better security results, with fewer unintended regional consequences.'~ At 
least these proposals shift the military away from the traditional antidrug 
campaigns and internal roles that have been sorely unsuccessful in Colom-
bia, Mexico, and Central America. 
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